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Abstract
We consider a durable-goods monopolist who is able to
control the collaborative consumption of its goods on an
aftermarket by a sharing tariff. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their respective need propensities in each period. We show that the firm may be able
to extract this private information by offering a nonlinear pricing scheme, which amounts to a menu of options that distinguish themselves by different combinations of retail price and sharing tariff, whereby the latter is charged to owners at the point of sharing their
item with a nonowner on the sharing market. The solution, which is obtained using optimal control theory,
critically depends on the product’s durability.

quadratic and decreasing while the sharing-tariff schedule is linear and increasing in the consumers’ subjective
likelihood of need. That means that someone who is
likely to need the item in the future will have to pay
a lower retail price in return for a larger ex-post payment to the firm for the right to share the item with others should the opportunity arise (whenever the item is
not needed). Our analysis examines the consumers’ and
the firm’s infinite-horizon dynamic decision problems in
steady state using optimal control theory (for the firm’s
screening problem) and standard dynamic programming
techniques applied to discrete-time Markovian systems
(for the consumers’ respective choice problems).

1.1

1

Literature

Introduction

Sharing markets allowing for mutual insurance among
consumers, whose payoffs depends on the realization of
A durable good may be shared with others whenever their uncertain needs, much in the spirit of Arrow (1953)
owners have no use for the product in a given time pe- [2]. These aftermarkets help consumers adapt their inriod. This gives rise to sharing markets, which have vestedness in the product, in the face of a binary debeen the subject of active investigation; see, e.g., [3, 4, 5, cision between ownership and nonownership whenever
6, 16, 17]. By retaining some form of aftermarket con- they are not already owners whose product is still in
trol over who uses a given item, as is now commonplace good working condition. While manufacturers have
for numerous products (such as long-term transporta- largely come to accept the existence of sharing markets,
tion tickets, software subscriptions, studio equipment, a widescale adjustment of product design and pricing,
phones, or computers), the original seller (or manufac- which can be viewed as a second-order effect of sharing
turer) can in principle charge the original buyer ex post markets, has not yet taken place. New models for effecfor usage transitions, including sharing “smart prod- tive surplus extraction need to be found, where the firm
ucts” with others [19].1 In this paper, we examine how can participate over a longer time horizon in the extracshareability control can be used for the purpose of non- tion of the unfolding consumer utility. For this a conlinear pricing (screening), even if the need-contingent trol of shareability is necessary. Such aftermarket conuse value is perfectly known and homogenous. The idea trol had been previously contemplated by firms mainly
is that agents’ propensities for having a high need for the through the active design of compatibility as well as
product in any given period are heterogeneous. The firm complements, resulting in proprietary product ecosyscan capitalize on this ex-ante need heterogeneity and de- tems that lock in consumers; [1] marks a beginning of
vise a menu of selling contracts which offer different re- that literature. Controlling the shareability of an item
tail prices and sharing tariffs, adapted to the consumer means to offer a one-time ‘license to share’ at the time
population.
when the current owner has a low need for the item. UsThe remarkable insight from our analysis is that ing a standard model, [19] determines the optimal fixed
largely independent of the specific distribution of sharing tariff to charge consumers for the right to share
consumer types the optimal retail-price schedule is perfectly durable products. Here, we examine the con1 The technological limitations of effective sharing control are receding rapidly for almost all durable goods, thus persistently expanding
the scope of this paper to a wide variety of products. Most limits of aftermarket sharing control thus far may be due to cost (e.g., a fingerprint
reader or retinal scan to unlock a drone) but are usually not fundamentally related to infeasibilty.
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struction of a nonlinear pricing model given any level
of durability. The idea of nonlinear pricing goes back
to the seminal contribution by Mirrlees (1971) [10] on
optimal taxation. Mussa and Rosen (1978) [11] adapted
these findings for second-degree price discrimination of
a continuum of consumer types. Our approach follows
the general model in [18], but includes a more detailed
discussion on how to determine the boundary values for
the firm’s optimal schedule, as well as the robustness.
To the best of our knowledge, the application of nonlinear pricing to the specifics of sharing markets is entirely
new.

1.2

Outline

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Sec. 2 describes the basic setup of the infinite-horizon
dynamic consumer choice, as well as the firm’s screening problem. Sec. 3 provides a complete set of optimality conditions which are used to characterize the firm’s
best nonlinear pricing schedule. Robustness and identfication issues are discussed. Sec. 4 discusses some implications for product design. We discuss our findings
in Sec. 5 and provide directions for further research.

2

Model

We consider a dynamic economy with a continuum of
infinitely lived consumers (also referred to as “agents”).
Without loss of generality, the total number of agents
is normalized to 1. This number can be scaled up as
needed without affecting any of the results in this paper.
At the beginning of each period t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, a consumer of type θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1] observes the realization of
his random binary need state s̃t (θ) ∈ {0, 1} for a given
durable good (e.g., a power tool, a computer, a piece of
software, or a car), which is distributed so that
P(s̃t (θ) = 1) = θ,
for all θ ∈ Θ, without any correlation across periods.
When the need state is high (i.e., st (θ) = 1), the agent
has a consumption utility of ν > 0 for the item; on the
other hand, when the need state is low (i.e., st = 0), his
consumption utility in the current period is zero. To focus our attention on the sharing-related type-attribute θ,
we assume that ν is identical across all consumers and
common knowledge, and that the consumer types θ are
distributed on the type space Θ according to the smooth
cumulative distribution function (cdf) F : Θ → [0, 1],
such that its derivative f = F 0 is increasing on Θ. This
means that almost all types are available with positive
probability density. In general, the durability q ∈ [0, 1]
of the firm’s product is not necessarily perfect. As in
2 The

Razeghian and Weber (2019) [14], the product fails in
any given period with probability 1 − q. Hence, for
q = 0 the good becomes completely disposable, while
for q = 1 it never breaks. We denote by g(θ) the (nonnormalized) density of potential buyers which naturally
depends on the product’s durability q as well as (multiplicatively) on the (normalized) density f (θ) of consumer types θ ∈ Θ. An explicit expression of this
steady-state density is provided in Sec. 2.3.

2.1

Consumer Choice

When his need state is high, an agent of type θ can
get access to the product by either purchasing it from
a monopolistic firm at the retail price r or borrow it on
a peer-to-peer market at the sharing price p. Once the
agent becomes an owner by purchasing the item, he remains an owner until the item breaks, which—as long
as q < 1—happens with probability 1 at some finite
time in the future. As an owner, the agent can use the
item when in need or rent it out on the sharing market
for a net revenue of p − τ , where the “sharing tariff”
τ is imposed by the firm for authorizing the transfer of
usership for one period, as in [17]. Hence, any agent
can find himself in four possible states, being either an
owner or a nonowner, and in either a high-need or a lowneed state. The per-period discount factor for all agents
is δ ∈ (0, 1).2 With a functioning sharing market, it is
clear that agents will consider acquiring ownership of
the product only if they are nonowners in a high-need
state. In that state, some agents may still prefer renting
the item from the sharing market rather than committing
to ownership. Let
p̂(θ) , p − τ (θ),
denote the effective transaction price for lenders in the
sharing market. With this, we consider first nonowners
and then owners.
Nonowners. The (discounted) value for nonowners
in the low-need state is

U0 = 0 + δ θU1 + (1 − θ)U0 ,
while for nonowners in the high-need state it is
U1 = max{A, B},
where the agent chooses between the expected nonownership value,

A = ν − p + δ θU1 + (1 − θ)U0 ,
obtained via access on the sharing market, and the expected ownership value,


B = ν−r+δ(1−q) θU1 +(1−θ)U0 +δq θV1 +(1−θ)V0 ,

obtained via buying the product from the retailer. Naturally, all of the payoffs (i.e., U0 , U1 , A, B) depend on
the consumer type θ.

discount factor is related to the per-period discount rate d > −1, as δ = 1/(1 + d).
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Owners. The (discounted) value for owners in the 2.2 Screening Problem
low-need state is

 To extract the type information from the otherwise
V0 = p̂+δ(1−q) θU1 +(1−θ)U0 +δq θV1 +(1−θ)V0 , anonymous consumers, the firm uses a screening mechanism M̂ = (M̂, α̂), where M̂ is a message space
whereas in the high-need state it becomes
and α̂ = (r̂, τ̂ ) : M̂ → R2+ is an allocation function


V1 = ν+δ(1−q) θU1 +(1−θ)U0 +δq θV1 +(1−θ)V0 . which maps any message m ∈ M̂ a given agent sends
to a tuple α̂(m) = (r̂(m), τ̂ (m)), which means that the
The ownership payoffs (i.e., V0 , V1 ) depend on the con- agent pays the retail price r̂(m) and accepts the sharsumer type θ.
ing tariff τ̂ (m) for future use transfers. We assume that
Solving the last four equations, it is straightforward the firm, which is also referred to as the “principal” in
to obtain the consumers’ state-contingent payoffs in a the context of the problem of designing its mechanism,
stationary regime. Important for the firm’s problem are can commit to M̂. That is, consumers do not have to
the nonowner’s payoffs in the high-need state, as the worry about the firm’s not fulfilling its pre-agreed oblinonowners are the only agents who would be candidates gations ex post, for example by renegotiating the sales
for purchasing the product.
contract based on the revealed information. The revelation principle [9, 12] allows the principal, without any
Lemma 1. Consider a stationary regime in the sharing
loss of generality, to restrict attention to so-called dieconomy. Nonowners in the high-need state obtain the
rect revelation mechanisms M = (M, α), where the
expected payoff U1 = max{A, B}, with
message space M is equal to the type space Θ and all


agents announce their types truthfully. This principle
δθ
(ν − p),
A= 1+
holds because any agent of type θ, when maximizing
1−δ
the payoff B from buying the product under the (indiwhen choosing product access via the sharing market, rect) mechanism M̂ would solve 3
and




(1−q)(θ r̂(m)−(1−θ)τ̂ (m))
δ ((1−θ)τ̂ (m)+
)
(1−q)(θr+(1−θ)p̂)
1−(1−θ)δq
δ θν + (1 − θ)p̂ −
− r̂(m) ,
max −
1−(1−θ)δq
1−δ
, m∈M
B =ν−r+
1−δ
with solution m̂∗ (θ). But the same allocation can be
when choosing to purchase the product.
achieved with the direct mechanism M = (Θ, α) with
The preceding result shows that a lack of durability α = (r, τ ) : Θ → R2+ , with r(θ) = r̂(m̂∗ (θ)) and
reduces the ownership payoffs, in the extreme to
τ (θ) = τ̂ (m̂∗ (θ)), for all θ ∈ Θ. Any type-θ agent




participating in M would therefore happily report
δθ
ν−r
B|q=0 = 1 +
(ν − r) =
A.
1−δ
ν−p
θ̂∗ (θ) = θ,
That is, provided that r = p (which is the only equilibrium when q = 0) any consumer’s payoff from a com- so that M is indeed a direct revelation mechanism as
pletely disposable product equals the payoff of not pur- claimed. The firm’s beliefs about the distributions of
chasing the product at all. On the other hand, a perfectly types on Θ are given by the cdf F introduced earlier. Its
steady-state per-period profit from a given participating
durable product provides the ownership payoff of
type θ is 4

δ
B|q=1 = ν − r +
θν + (1 − θ)p̂ .
1−δ
π(r, τ, θ) = ȳ1 (θ) r + y0 (θ) τ, θ ∈ Θ0 ,
Thus, the value of perfect durability is obtained as the
where ȳs (resp., ys ) denotes the steady-state probabilidifference between these two values:
ties of a nonowner (resp., an owner) being in the need

δ
state s ∈ {0, 1}; see Sec. 2.3. Agents participating in
B|q=1 − B|q=0 =
θr + (1 − θ)p̂ .
1−δ
the principal’s mechanism must expect a payoff B from
High likelihood types prefer durable products because buying that exceeds the payoff A expected when getting
they avoid having to purchase the item again, whereas access to the product on the sharing market, thus leading
low likelihood types expect extra payoff from being able to a type-dependent individual-rationality constraint,
to rent out a perfectly durable item on the sharing market in any low-need state in the future.
B ≥ A.
(IR)
3 All

terms in B that are constant with respect to (r̂, τ̂ ) have been omitted, without any loss of generality.
keep things simple we restrict attention to revenues. Introducing a production-cost term does not introduce any fundamental difficulties. Our setting includes permanent transportation passes that become obsolete (because of a different transportation need) or are lost with
probability q from one period to another.
4 To
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This participation constraint defines the participation
set Θ0 ⊂ Θ for a given schedule (r, τ ). To convert the
principal’s mechanism design problem into a tractable
optimal control problem, we first note that the participation set is convex, provided natural monotonicity of the
principal’s schedule (implied by (IC) and (M) below).

That is, for the schedule (r, τ ) to be implementable,
the firm’s sharing tariff τ needs to be nondecreasing.
By virtue of (IC) the sharing-tariff schedule implies the
retail-price schedule r on the participation set Θ0 , up to
a constant.
Introducing the control variable

Lemma 2. Let r0 ≤ 0 ≤ τ 0 . Without loss of generality,5
u = τ 0,
the participation set is of the form Θ0 = [θ0 , 1], with
(r0 , τ0 ) = (r(θ0 ), τ (θ0 )) and 6
in the class of bounded measurable functions, we can


now formulate the firm’s screening problem as an optip − (1 − δq)r0
,
(1) mal control problem of the form
θ0 = 1 −
δqτ0
[0,1]
Z 1
as long as qτ0 > 0. For q = 0, it is θ0 = 1{r0 >p} ;
V (r, τ, θ0 ) =
π(r, τ, θ) dF (θ) −→ max , (*)
r,τ,θ0
for τ0 = 0, it is θ0 = 1{r0 >p/(1−δq)} .
θ0
The proof of the last result follows from examining
the sign of the difference B − A. For qτ0 > 0 it is positive, as long as the term (p − r + (r − (1 − θ)τ )δq)
is positive. But the latter has a positive slope due to the
assumed monotonicity of the principal’s schedule.
The marginal type θ0 is fully determined by the
starting point (r0 , τ0 ) of the principal’s schedule (r, τ ).
Note also that θ0 = 1 effectively corresponds to an
empty participation set, as its (Lebesque-)measure vanishes in that case. La. 2 implies that whenever a type
decides to purchase the firm’s product, all higher types
also purchase. Thus, the type space is partitioned into
two disjoint convex sets of buyers (Θ0 ) and nonbuyers
(Θ̄0 = Θ \ Θ0 ).
The participating agents’ truth-telling constraint requires the first-order necessary optimality condition
for maximizing the purchase utility B with respect
to the announcement θ̂ (so as to obtain the contract
(r(θ̂), τ (θ̂)) to be satisfied at θ̂ = θ, so


q(1−θ)(1−(1−θ)δ)τ 0 (θ)+(1−q)θr 0 (θ)
δ
r0 (θ) + 1−δ
= 0,
1−(1−θ)δq

subject to r(θ0 ) = r0 , τ (θ0 ) = τ0 , Eq. (1), and


u(θ),
r0 (θ) = − (1−θ)δq
1−δq
0

(2)

τ (θ) = u(θ),
u(θ) ∈ [0, ρ],

(3)
(4)

∈

(5)

θ

[θ0 , 1].

Eqs. (2) and (3) encapsulate the incentive-compatibility
constraint (IC) and the definition of the control u as the
slope of the sharing-tariff schedule. Eq. (4) incorporates the implementability constraint (M) by requiring
a sign-semidefinite and bounded control. The positive
constant ρ denotes the upper bound for the control. It is
necessary to apply standard optimality conditions; see
Sec. 3. Finally, Eq. (5) restricts the firm’s attention to
types in the participation set Θ0 .
Lemma 3. There exists a solution (r∗ , τ ∗ , θ0∗ ) (together
with an optimal control u∗ ), defined on Θ∗0 = [θ0∗ , 1], to
the optimal control problem (*) subject to Eqs. (1)–(5).

Proof. See [7, 8].
resulting in the incentive-compatibility constraint


τ 0 (θ), θ ∈ Θ0 .
(IC)
r0 (θ) = − (1−θ)δq
1−δq

2.3

Steady-State Sales Distribution

Using the second-order necessary optimality condition
for truth-telling implies that


r00 (θ) + (1−θ)δq
τ 00 (θ) ≥ 0, θ ∈ Θ0 .
1−δq

In steady state, the number of potential buyers, for any
given consumer type θ ∈ Θ0 , is constant. It is composed
of those nonowners who are in a high need state (i.e.,
those who observed a realization st (θ) = 1 at the beginOn the other hand, differentiating the incentive- ning of the current time period t). Current nonowners
may have been owners (in the previous period) whose
compatibility condition (IC) yields
items failed (which happens with probability 1 − q). On




δq
00
0
the other hand they may also have been nonowners. In
r00 (θ) + (1−θ)δq
τ
(θ)
−
τ
(θ)
=
0,
1−δq
1−δq
order to find the steady-state distribution of buyers (corfor all θ ∈ Θ0 , which gives the implementability con- responding to the firm’s sales) we need to determine the
straint
stationary distribution of the underlying Markov process
τ 0 (θ) ≥ 0, θ ∈ Θ0 .
(M) with state transitions from nonowners (in low or high

5 For θ = 1, the measure of the participation set Θ = {1} vanishes, so that the actual participation of the highest type θ = 1 is of no
0
0
consequence for the firm and for the solution to its screening problem.
6 We use the shorthand [x]
[0,1] , max{0, min{1, x}} for the restriction of any x ∈ R to the interval [0, 1].
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need state) to owners (in low or high need state). By
construction, a nonowner of type θ ∈ Θ0 in a high need
state will purchase the product and therefore transition
to being an owner. The corresponding Markov transition matrix for the shifts among the four possible states
is given by


1−θ
θ
0
0
 (1 − θ)(1 − q) θ(1 − q) (1 − θ)q θq 

P=
 (1 − θ)(1 − q) θ(1 − q) (1 − θ)q θq  .
(1 − θ)(1 − q) θ(1 − q) (1 − θ)q θq

(ii) Adjoint Equation:


∗ ∗
,τ ,u∗ ,θ,ψ)
(ψr0 , ψτ0 ) = − ∂H(r ∂(r,τ
, θ ∈ Θ∗0 ;
)
(iii) Transversality:
(ψr (1), ψτ (1)) = 0.

The three optimality conditions provided by Theorem 1 need to be supplemented by appropriate boundary
conditions so as to fix the initial values r0∗ , r∗ (θ0∗ ) and
>
The stationary distribution y = (ȳ0 , ȳ1 , y0 , y1 ) is such τ0∗ , τ ∗ (θ0∗ ), as well as an optimality condition for the
optimal type threshold θ0∗ . While the boundary condithat y> P = y> , which yields
tions can be found based on economic viability of the
>

θ(1−q)
(1−θ)θq
(1−θ)(1−q)
θ2 q
sharing market in conjunction with the individual ratio,
y = 1−(1−θ)q , 1−(1−θ)q , 1−(1−θ)q , 1−(1−θ)q
nality in Eq. (1), the marginal type θ0∗ will be derived by
as the steady-state probabilities ps of being a nonowner subsequent global optimization with respect to the type
or owner in the states s ∈ {0, 1}. As a result, the prob- threshold.
ability of a random agent in the current period of the
given type θ ∈ Θ0 to be a buyer is ȳ1 , and to be a lender 3.2 Solution
it is y0 . For perfectly durable goods (when q = 1) it
is y = (0, 0, 1 − θ, θ)> , while for completely dispos- We first use Thm. 1 to derive the parametrized “shape”
of the firm’s optimal schedule (r∗ , τ ∗ ), and then pin
able products (when q = 0) it is y = (1 − θ, θ, 0, 0)> .
down the unique solution by an initial condition for the
schedule, followed by an optimal solution for the problem of finding the optimal marginal type θ0∗ .
3 Optimal Pricing Schedule

3.1

Optimality Conditions

In order to solve the firm’s variational problem (*) subject to the constraints (1)–(5) we use the Pontryagin
maximum principle (PMP) as necessary optimality condition [13, 15].7 For this, we first introduce the Hamiltonian
H(r, τ, u, θ, ψ) = π(r, τ, θ)f (θ) − ψr



(1−θ)δq
1−δq



1

Z
ψr (θ) =

where ψ = (ψr , ψτ ) : [θ0 , 1] → R denotes an adjoint
variable which quantifies the “shadow value” of changes
in the schedule (r, τ ) as a function of the independent
variable θ (corresponding to the consumer’s type). Applying the PMP, the firm’s optimal schedule (r∗ , τ ∗ ) is
characterized by the following optimality conditions.
Theorem 1 (PMP). Let (r∗ , τ ∗ , θ0∗ ), together with the
optimal control u∗ be a solution to the optimal control
problem (*) subject to (1)–(5). Then there exists an absolutely continuous adjoint variable ψ = (ψr , ψτ ), defined on Θ∗0 = [θ0∗ , 1], so that the following optimality
conditions are satisfied:
(i) Maximality:
u∗ (θ) ∈ arg max H(r∗ , τ ∗ , u, θ, ψ), θ ∈ Θ∗0 ;

ȳ1 (ϑ) dF (ϑ),

(6)

y0 (ϑ) dF (ϑ),

(7)

θ

and
u + ψτ u,

2

u∈[0,ρ]

Shape ((r∗ , τ ∗ )). Taking into account the transversality
condition at the boundary θ = 1, the adjoint equation
yields closed-form expressions for the adjoint variables:

Z
ψτ (θ) =

1

θ

for all θ ∈ Θ∗0 . Because of the linearity of the Hamiltonian in u, the maximality condition implies that either
the control is singular (when ∂H/∂u = 0) or the control
is extremal (when ∂H/∂u 6= 0). Indeed,


∂H
= ψτ − ψr (1−θ)δq
1−δq
∂u
vanishes at the endpoint θ = 1, as ψr (1) = ψτ (1) = 0
by the transversality condition. Since it is also decreasing in θ, it follows that ∂H/∂u > 0 on the interior
of Θ∗0 , so
u∗ (θ) = ρ, θ ∈ Θ∗0 .
That is, the optimal control is nonsingular and lies on
the boundary of the control-constraint set [0, ρ]. In particular, the sharing tariff increases linearly at the rate ρ.

7 The boundedness of the control, as required in Eq. (4), is usually required in the proofs of standard versions of the PMP (which do not allow

for impulse controls and jumps in the state variables—here (r, τ )) [13, 15]; in our setup, boundedness of the control implies a rate constraint
on the sharing tariff.
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(whence τ ∗ (θ) ≡ pθ) and, via Eq. (1) (outside of saturation),


1 − δq(1 − θ0∗ )θ0∗
∗
r0 =
p (> p),
(11)
1 − δq
for all θ0∗ ∈ Θ. This fixes the initial value (r0∗ , τ0∗ ) of
the firm’s optimal schedule (r∗ , τ ∗ ) as a function of the
marginal type θ0∗ , which is determined next.
Marginal Type (θ0∗ ). The firm’s profit as a function of
the marginal type θ0∗ is
Z 1
∗
π =
(ȳ1 (θ) r∗ (θ) + y0 (θ) τ ∗ (θ)) dF (θ).
θ0∗

Taking into account that ∂τ ∗ /∂θ0∗ = 0 and
∂r∗
δpqθ0∗
=
,
∗
∂θ0
1 − δq
it is, by virtue of Leibniz’ rule and Eq. (6),


dπ ∗
δpqθ ∗
g(θ0∗ ) , ∗ = 1−δq0 ψr (θ0∗ ) − π(r0∗ , τ0∗ , θ0∗ )f (θ0∗ ),
dθ0
for all possible marginal types θ0∗ ∈ Θ. Clearly, θ0∗ = 1
can be excluded, as it leads to zero profit for the firm.
For an interior marginal type, optimality requires that
the standard first-order condition holds, that is,
Figure 1: Optimal retail-price schedule r∗ (θ) and
sharing-tariff schedule τ ∗ (θ) as a function of θ ∈ Θ∗0 .

θ0∗ ∈ (0, 1) ⇒ g(θ0∗ ) = 0.

∗
By virtue of Eq. (2), the firm’s optimal schedule (r∗ , τ ∗ ) Alternatively, θ0 may be optimal, resulting therefore in
the necessary optimality condition
has the components

 2

θ0∗ g(θ0∗ ) = 0.
(12)
δρq
(θ0∗ )2
θ
∗
∗
∗
r (θ) = r0 −
−
θ − θ0 −
(8)
1 − δq
2
2
[20] provides necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the underlying global optimization problem on
and
an interval, which can easily be solved numerically by
τ ∗ (θ) = τ0∗ + ρ (θ − θ0∗ ) ,
(9) simply tracking π ∗ for θ∗ ∈ [0, 1), so as to choose
0

for θ ∈ Θ∗0 .

θ0∗ ∈ arg max π(r∗ , τ ∗ , θ0 ).

(13)
θ0 ∈Θ
Initial Value
The rate of increase ρ is not arbitrary, as the sharing tariff is naturally bounded by the Main Result. The following main result summarizes
price p on the sharing market, so necessarily
our findings regarding a full characterization of the solution to the firm’s screening problem.
τ1∗ , τ ∗ (1) ≤ p.
Theorem 2 (Characterization). Let ρ = p. A soluIf we assume that the full sharing rent can be extracted tion (r∗ , τ ∗ , θ0∗ ) to the principal’s screening problem
for the highest likelihood type (for whom the no-need (*), subject to Eqs. (1)–(5), is characterized by Eqs. (8)–
contingency is a zero-probability event) and set τ1∗ = p, (11) in conjunction with Eq. (13).
then it becomes clear that the slope ρ of the optimal sharTo compute the solution in practice, one could start
ing tariff τ ∗ is bounded from above by p, as
by determining the adjoint variable in Eq. (6) and determine the candidates for the optimal marginal type
p − τ0∗
≤ p.
ρ≤
based on the necessary optimality condition (12), so as
∗
1 − θ0
to satisfy Eq. (13). Substituting θ0∗ in Eqs. (10) and (11)
yields the missing initial values in the specification of
Thus, setting ρ = p implies
the firm’s optimal schedule in Eqs. (8) and (9); see
τ0∗ = τ1∗ − p(1 − θ0∗ ) = pθ0∗ ,
(10) Sec. 3.7 for an example.
((r0∗ , τ0∗ )).
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3.3

Type-Free Schedule

It is possible to eliminate the type parameter from
the firm’s optimal schedule (r∗ (θ), τ ∗ (θ)) in Eqs. (8)
and (9). Indeed, τ ∗ (θ) = τ (together with the assumption that ρ = p) implies the one-to-one mapping
τ 7→ θ(τ ), with
θ(τ ) = θ0∗ +

τ − τ0∗
∈ Θ∗0 ,
p

for τ ∈ [τ0∗ , p], so that we obtain a “type-free” schedule R(τ ) = r∗ (θ(τ )) of the purchase price as a function
of the desired sharing premium:
R(τ ) = r0∗ −

δq
1 − δq



1 − θ0∗ −

τ − τ0∗
2p



(τ − τ0∗ ).

Figure 2: Type-free schedule.

3.4

Robustness

It is remarkable that the shape of the optimal schedule (r∗ , τ ∗ ), or—equivalently—the shape of the corresponding type-free schedule R(τ ), does not depend


on very detailed information about the consumers’ type
τ
δq
1−
< 0,
R0 (τ ) = −
distribution. Indeed, only the marginal type θ0∗ (and
1 − δq
p
through it the initial value (r0∗ , τ0∗ )) depends on F . The
cdf is used for computing the adjoint variable ψ =
for all τ ∈ [0, p), and it is convex, as
(ψr , ψτ ) in Eqs. (6) and (7), which can be interpreted as
the volume of purchase and sharing transactions, respec1 δq
tively. Estimating the type distribution F , which a priori
00
> 0,
R (τ ) =
is an infinite-dimensional object, would in principle rep 1 − δq
quire nonparametric identification. This in turn would a
for all τ ∈ [0, p]. Note that the sharing tariff τ indexes priori require a significant amount of data to produce an
the firm’s menu of contracts. More specifically, for any acceptable statistical fit. Thus, the company would need
given τ ∈ [τ0∗ , p], the contract (R(τ ), τ ) is chosen by to gather (or procure) user-centric longitudinal informaconsumers of type θ(τ ). Since τ —as a prospective drain tion by observing customers’ usage patterns for durable
on future rents—is not a desirable product attribute, its goods. This type of estimation may be feasible when
absence does constitute an attractive contract feature. the firm already has a significant installed base, much
in contrast to a situation without significant service exMore specifically, it is useful to interpret
perience. However, the parametric form of the optimal
nonlinear pricing scheme suggests that a detailed estiP = p − τ ∈ [0, P̄ ]
mation of the type distribution is not really necessary, as
the firm can instead focus on the much simpler task of
as a (desirable) “premium” that comes with the share- tuning the schedule’s only distribution-sensitive paramable good, which is bounded from above by P̄ = p−τ0∗ . eter (θ0∗ ).
The corresponding direct schedule
The type-free schedule is decreasing, as

R̂(P ) = R(p − P ), P ∈ [0, P̄ ]
is increasing in P and concave in P , as one would expect in a standard nonlinear pricing scheme with quantity discounts. That means that from the firm’s perspective the valuable types, i.e., those who select the contract
with the highest product premium (reflected by the lowest sharing tariff), are in fact those consumers in the participation set Θ∗0 with the lowest types. The consumers
with the lowest need for the item in the future must be
afforded the largest product premium.

3.5

Identification

Without loss of generality, consider the firm’s type-free
schedule which can be written in the parametric form
R(τ ) = R0 + a(p − τ ) + b

(p − τ )2
, τ ∈ [τ0 , p],
2

where a and b are nonnegative parameters, and R0 is
the product’s “stand-alone” retail price when sharing is
disallowed (i.e., for τ = p). Since R0 (p) = 0, we find
that
a = 0.
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In addition, comparing the second derivative R00 (τ ) = b
with the result in Sec. 3.3 yields
b=

1 δq
.
p 1 − δq

θ0∗

Hence, we can rewrite the firm’s type-free schedule as
R(τ ) = R0 + 12



δpq
1−δq

would need to be equal to the sharing supply (from owners in the low-need state), using Eq. (6),
Z 1
y0 (θ) dF (θ) = ψτ (θ0∗ ),
S(θ0∗ ) ,


2
1 − τp , τ ∈ [τ0 , p], (14)

for any θ0∗ ∈ Θ. The resulting market-clearing condition,
D(θ0∗ ) = S(θ0∗ ),
(15)

determines the marginal type θ0∗ as a function of the
where the parameters R0 and τ0 need to be identified product durability q; see Sec. 3.7 for an example. We
(e.g., by learning algorithms), whenever a reliable esti- note that because of the uniform contingent use value ν
mate of the type distribution F is not available.
across consumer types, the sharing price p ∈ [0, ν] can8
Remark. The value for R0 may be fairly easy to boot- not be determined by market clearing alone.
strap by observing the prices for extant non-shareable
substitutes. In our model, this is the price paid by the 3.7 Illustration
highest likelihood type (θ = 1) who has a constant need
for the item. This consumer type is provided with an Consider the case of a uniform type 9distribution
efficient sharing tariff τ = p extracting the full surplus where F (θ) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1]. Based on
to
from the zero-probability aftermarket transactions, and Eqs. (9) and (10), the sharing tariff is proportional
∗
∗
the
consumer
type
and
independent
of
θ
:
τ
(θ)
≡
pθ.
0
he obtains in return the largest “information rent” as surGiven the uniformity of the type distribution (and in the
plus over his outside option,
absence of market-clearing considerations), it is best for


the firm to be all-inclusive (i.e., θ0∗ = 0) which we illusp
1 − δq
− R0 ,
[B − A]|θ=1 =
trate for the special cases of perfectly durable products
1 − δ 1 − δq
(q = 1) and completely disposable products (q = 0).
where
For q = 1, the payoff-relevant steady-state probabilities
become ȳ1 = 0 (as nobody will need to purchase a
δpq (1 − θ0∗ )2
product ever again) and y0 = 1 − θ. Hence,
,
R0 = R(p) = r0∗ −
1 − δq
2


Z 1
1 − (3 − 2θ0∗ )(θ0∗ )2
∗
p,
π
=
p
(1
−
θ)θ
dθ
=
so that the highest information rent becomes
6
θ0∗
δpq 1 − (θ0∗ )2
.
1−δ
2

which is strictly decreasing in θ0∗ ∈ (0, 1), so that full
inclusivity (θ0∗ = 0) is optimal, resulting in a profit
of π ∗ = p/6—entirely from sharing authorizations.
For q = 0, the payoff-relevant steady-state probabil3.6 Market Clearing
ities are ȳ1 = θ and y0 = 0. Moreover, r∗ (θ) ≡ p, and
In our setting, with uniform consumption value ν across the firm’s profit,
all agents, the clearing price p ∈ [0, ν] on the sharing


Z 1
market is exogenous. When the firm is a monopolist
1 − (θ0∗ )2
∗
p,
π =p
θ dθ =
both in the primary (retail) and the secondary (sharing)
2
θ0∗
market, the sharing price may be induced by the firm’s
optimal schedule, and naturally the firm would have an is strictly decreasing in the marginal type, so that
∗
incentive to set p = ν, i.e., at the highest possible value, again θ0 = 0 is optimal. This generates the profit
∗
π
=
p/2—exclusively
from retail.
as this guarantees maximum rent extraction from the afComparing
the
firm’s
optimal profits for q ∈ {0, 1}
termarket, without compromising retail sales. On the
suggests
that
a
disposable
product yields a payoff that is
other hand, in steady state the sharing demand (from
3
times
as
high,
not
even
considering
cost. However, usnonowners in the high-need state),
ing the market-clearing condition (15) to determine the
Z θ0∗
marginal type (yielding θ0∗ = 1/2 for q = 1, and θ0∗ = 0
θ dF (θ),
D(θ0∗ ) ,
for q = 0) doubles the profit ratio to 6.
[B − A]|θ=1 =

0

8 In

practice, a given firm would need to take the sharing price p as an exogenous factor, especially in situations where the sharing supply is
composed of a variety of substitute products, most of whichhthe firm has no control over.
i
9 The per-period unit volume of retail is ψ (θ ∗ )
r 0

=

1−q
q

1 − θ0∗ −

for q = 0. The per-period unit volume of sharing licenses is ψτ (θ0∗ )
ψτ (θ0∗ ) = 0 for q = 0.

1−q
ln(1 − (1 − θ0∗ )q) for q
q
∗
∗
(1−θ0
)(2−(1+θ0
)q)
=
+ 1−q
2q
q2

∈ (0, 1], and ψr (θ0∗ ) = (1−(θ0∗ )2 )/2
ln(1 − (1 − θ0∗ )q) for q ∈ (0, 1], and
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3.8

Nonstationary Regime

The preceding result describes the firm’s best stationary schedule, when faced with a nonstationary distribution of states starting with initial distribution y0 .

The preceding developments were limited to the regime
where the different states were distributed according to
the stationary distribution y; see Sec. 2.3. However, the
firm may care substantially about the nonstationary behavior of the consumers, before reaching steady state. 4 Implications for Product Design
Given the initial distribution y(0) = y0 at time t = 0,
The combination of retail price and sharing tariff allows
the distribution at time t > 0 is given by
the firm to extract type-specific rents, without bunching,
y> (t) = y0> Pt .
from all participating customers. Enabling the products
Hence, the firm’s net present value of the sched- technologically to detect and control usage transitions
(e.g., by adding a fingerprint reader), as required for the
ule (r∗ , τ ∗ ),
meaningful implementation of a positive sharing tariff,
Z 1X
∞

may be costly; see [19].11
∗
t
> t
∗ ∗
>
Π (y0 ) =
δ y0 P (0, r , τ , 0) dF (θ),
La. 2 implies that the optimal monopoly price withθ0∗ t=0
out sharing rent (i.e., for τ = 0) is rm = p/(1 − δq), redepends on the initial distribution y0 .
sulting (for a stationary regime) in the per-period profit
Examples. (i) Starting at the stationary distribution,
Z
y(0) = y, the firm’s discounted payoff is
(1 − q) p 1 θ dF (θ)
m
m
.
V , V (r , 0, 0) =
∞
X
1 − δq 0 1 − (1 − θ)q
π∗
∗
t ∗
,
Π (y) =
δπ =
1−δ
t=0
Provided the required investment I for the detection
where the per-period profit π ∗ is given by ȳ1 r∗ + y0 τ ∗ . technology and a per-period cost γ related to the mon(ii) For perfectly durable products (q = 1), there are itoring and administration of usage transitions, for the
no repeat purchases. Given the initial distribution y0 = sharing control to be economically viable, the following
condition needs to be satisfied:
(1 − θ, θ, 0, 0)> , the firm’s discounted payoff is
Z 1
∞
X
γ
V (r∗ , τ ∗ , θ0∗ ) − V m
Π∗ (y0 ) =
δt
(ȳ1,t r∗ (θ) + y0,t τ ∗ (θ)) dF (θ),
I+
≤
.
1−δ
1−δ
θ0∗
t=0
where ȳ1,t , θ(1−θ)t and y0,t , (1−θ)(1−(1−θ)t ).10
Compared with Sec. 3.7, a substantial portion of the
firm’s profit now stems from retail, which in the stationary regime is not a source of benefit.
Generalized Solution. Thm. 2 generalizes to nonstationary state distributions, by replacing condition (13)
for the optimal marginal type as follows:
θ0∗

∗

∗

∈ arg max π̂(r , τ , θ0 ),

The firm’s monopoly profit vanishes for perfectly
durable goods (i.e., when q = 1), rendering active sharing authorization a strictly improving strategy in that
case.

5

Conclusion

(13’)

Heterogeneity in the agents’ need propensities in conjunction with the firm’s assumed capacity to control its
where, for any θ0 ∈ Θ,
products’ shareability opens the opportunity for secondZ 1

degree price discrimination. The firm can offer a menu
∗ ∗
∗
∗
π̂(r , τ , θ0 ) ,
Ȳ0 r (θ) + Y0 τ (θ) dF (θ),
of options to the agents which self-select into differθ0
P∞ t
P∞ t
ent product offerings. Each option consists of a retail
with Ȳ1 , t=0 δ ȳ1,t and Y0 , t=0 δ y0,t .
price and a sharing tariff. We have shown that for a rateTheorem 3 (Generalized Characterization). Under constrained sharing tariff it is optimal for the firm to prothe conditions of Thm. 2, a solution (r∗ , τ ∗ , θ0∗ ) to the vide a retail-price schedule that is quadratically decreasproblem of maximizing the principal’s discounted profit ing in a consumer’s likelihood type and a sharing-tariff
Π∗ (y0 ) for any given initial distribution y0 , subject to schedule that is linearly increasing in the agent’s likeliEqs. (1)–(5), is characterized by Eqs. (8)–(11) in con- hood type (see Fig. 1), whereby the rate of increase is
junction with Eq. (13’).
such that the highest type (θ = 1) is offered effectively
θ0 ∈Θ

10 At time t > 0, the probability of not yet having bought the item over the previous t periods (from 0 to t − 1) is (1 − θ)t , so
that ȳ1,t = θ(1 − θ)t . Summing up the purchasers of the previous periods yields (by the geometric-series formula) (1 − (1 − θ)t ), so
that in the current period the fraction of owners in the low-need state becomes y0,t = (1 − θ)(1 − (1 − θ)t ). Note also that, as t → ∞, one
obtains ȳ1,t → 0 and y0,t → 1 − θ, consistent with our remarks at the end of Sec. 2.3.
11 In some cases the costs may be very low, e.g., when sharing a train ticket, which requires merely an update of the usage authorization.
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a stand-alone product (with disabled shareability) where
the sharing tariff equals the price of access p in the sharing market.
Not all agents may choose to participate. The schedule of sharing tariffs then starts at a positive amount
and increases linearly to the sharing price p. Agents
with sharing propensity θ below the marginal likelihood
type θ0∗ do not purchase and rather seek product access
on a need-basis in the sharing market. The model can be
closed, since all owners who do not need the item in the
current period may rent it to nonowners in need, which
determines the sharing price in equilibrium.
In the main text, we have abstracted from the possibility of user-tracking between purchases, where a type
might already be known because of an earlier purchase
with the company. This user-centric traceability would
generically lead to an incentive to report types untruthfully, so as to retain anonymity and thus a potential for
information rent in the future. Instead we assume that
consumers may anonymize themselves, for example, by
generating a new user account, so that the firm does
not know more about repeat buyers than about first-time
buyers.
Interesting extensions of the present model include
serial need correlation, heterogeneity with respect to
need-contingent use value ν, and the possibility to vary
the product durability (instead or in addition to the sharing tariff). The model as it stands illustrates the possibilities a firm gains when equipping their products with
technology that allows for the detection of usage transitions; see also [19]. The present findings are robust in
the sense that the basic shape of the optimal schedule
is independent of the precise distribution of types; see
Sec. 3.4 for details.
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